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Abstract
Philosophers writing about the ravens paradox often note that Nicod’s
Condition (NC) holds given some set of background information, and fails
to hold against others, but rarely go any further. That is, it is usually not
explored which background information makes NC true or false. The present
paper aims to fill this gap. For us, “(objective) background knowledge” is
restricted to information that can be expressed as probability events. Any
other configuration is regarded as being subjective and a property of the a
priori probability distribution. We study NC in two specific settings. In the
first case, a complete description of some individuals is known, e.g. one knows
of each of a group of individuals whether they are black and whether they
are ravens. In the second case, the number of individuals having a particular
property is given, e.g. one knows how many ravens or how many black things
there are (in the relevant population). While some of the most famous answers
to the paradox are measure-dependent, our discussion is not restricted to
any particular probability measure. Our most interesting result is that in
the second setting, NC violates a simple kind of inductive inference (namely
projectability). Since relative to NC, this latter rule is more closely related to,
and more directly justified by our intuitive notion of inductive reasoning, this
tension makes a case against the plausibility of NC. In the end, we suggest
that the informal representation of NC may seem to be intuitively plausible
because it can easily be mistaken for reasoning by analogy.
Keywords
Nicod’s condition (NC), Raven paradox, weak projectability (PJ), reasoning
by analogy (RA), inductive inference.
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1 Introduction
In this article, we study induction and in particular Nicod’s Condition (NC) from
a Bayesian (in the sense of subjective probability) point of view. Rules of induc-
tion can be thought of as such restrictions on the class of probability measures (or
equivalently, on the class of rational agents1 ).
The question is: “How can we agree that any particular rule of induction is plau-
sible and generally entails sensible consequences and therefore should be accepted a
priori?”. We are interested in a specific rule, namely NC which informally speaking
states that “A proposition of the form All F are G is supported by the observation
that a particular object is both F and G” [Hem45]. Does the fact that NC, does
not seem to be counterintuitive suffice to persuade us that it is a plausible rule of
induction? How can we be sure that it does not violate other intuitively acceptable
rules and principles? As the notorious raven paradox [Hem45] shows, NC actually
does entail counterintuitive consequences, and more than seven decades of discussion
about this paradox shows that assessment of rules of induction can be extremely
problematic.
A summary of the raven paradox is as follows: The hypothesis H := “All ravens
are black” is logically equivalent to Hˆ := “Every thing that is not black is not a
raven”. A green apple is neither black nor a raven therefore according to NC its
observation should confirm Hˆ. But H is logically equivalent to Hˆ , so we end up
with a Paradoxical Conclusion (PC), that an observation of a green apple confirms
that all ravens are black, which is counterintuitive. In order to resolve the paradox,
either it should be shown that NC is not a plausible rule of induction or it should
be claimed that PC holds and should not be considered as being counterintuitive.2
In order to study the paradox from a Bayesian perspective, first we make a dis-
tinction between (objective) background knowledge by which we exclusively refer
to the knowledge that can be represented (and consequently can be thought of) as
previously observed events, and any other kinds of information which we consider
as being subjective and a property of the a priori chosen probability measure (i.e.
the initial degrees of beliefs). The cogency of inductive rules is significantly affected
by the given background knowledge and the chosen measures. For example, it is
already known that relative to some background knowledge, NC violates intuition
(e.g. see [Goo67]). In Section 2.1, we argue that relative to unrestricted background
knowledge, not only NC but any rule of induction can be refuted. Hempel him-
self believed that NC and the raven paradox should be considered in the context
of absolutely no background information [Hem67]. From a Bayesian perspective,
1 The term rational agent (that is, the performer of induction), as used in fields such as decision
theory and artificial intelligence [RN03], by definition, refers to an agent that satisfies certain
consistency axioms (see [Sav54]). Representation theorems show that this implies that the agent
has a probability distribution representing a priori beliefs for what will happen and utilities for the
various possible outcomes, such that decisions can be explained as maximizing expected utility.
Given utilities we can from simpler axioms [SH11] infer the existence of a probability distribution.
2Some authors have even denied the equivalence of H and Hˆ [SG72].
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however, this does not solve the problem. The reason is that background knowledge
and priors are convertible (in the sense that they can produce the same effects). For
example if we are not allowed to consider NC in the context that we possess the
background knowledge that “an object a has a property F” (denoted as: Fa), we
can (approximately) produce the same situation by subjectively believing that the
probability that that object has the property F , is sufficiently close to 1 (denoted as:
pr(Fa) ≈ 1).
3,4 Therefore, if we want to restrict ourselves to the context of perfect
ignorance, not only should we possess no objective knowledge, we should also only
be permitted to reason based on an absolutely unbiased probability measure. This
raises an important question: “What is an unbiased measure?” Due to its subjective
nature, this question does not have a definitive answer but by far, the most widely
considered choice is the uniform measure.5,6 On the other hand, it is well known that
using the uniform measure, inductive learning is not possible [Car50]. This shows
that from the subjective probabilistic perspective, choosing a probability measure
that satisfies the condition of perfect ignorance and allows inductive learning, is
arguably impossible.
It is also notable that demonstrating that a specific probability measure does (or
does not) comply with a rule of induction (or a statement such as PC), does not
illuminate the reason why a typical human observer believes that such a rule (or
statement) is implausible (or plausible). Conversely, one might argue that compli-
ance of a probability measure with a counterintuitive statement such as PC, may
3 According to Cournot’s principle [Cou43], we do not allow 1 (or 0) priors for events that
may or may not happen. If it was allowed then assuming pr(Fa) = 1, would exactly produce the
same effect that possessing the background knowledge “a is F” would. This would be problematic,
because assigning probability 1 to the events that are not determined (by background knowledge)
may lead to undefined conditional probabilities (in case the complement events occur). However,
assigning a probability that is arbitrarily close to one (i.e. pr(Fa) ≈ 1) does not cause such a
problem while it approximately produces the effect of the same background knowledge to arbitrary
precision.
4 Although for Hempel and his contemporaries, the confirmation theory was (more or less) a
logical relation, akin to deductive entailment, rather than a probabilistic relation (in the formal
sense) [FH10], what we mentioned about the convertibility of objective information and subjective
beliefs, was in a way reflected in their discussions: Good’s Red Herring [Goo67] provided a hypo-
thetical objective background setting with respect to which, NC does not hold. Hempel’s assertion
that “NC should be considered in the context of no (objective) background information” was in
fact an attempt to address such an issue. However, nothing could prevent Good from producing
the same effect by simply replacing the objective information with subjective a priori beliefs of a
new born baby (Good’s baby [Goo68]).
5 The main justification is due to the principle of maximum entropy [Jay03]. This principle
recommends that one choose, among all the probability measures satisfying a constraint, the mea-
sure which maximizes the Shannon entropy. In the absence of any background knowledge (i.e. no
constraint), the uniform probability measure maximizes entropy.
6 An alternative to the uniform measure is Solomonoff’s theory of universal inductive inference
[Sol64] which mathematically formalizes and puts together Occam’s razor (the principle that the
simplest model consistent with the background knowledge should be chosen) and Epicurus’ prin-
ciple of multiple explanations (that all explanations consistent with background knowledge should
be kept) (see [Hut07] or [RH11]).
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suggest that this measure does not provide a suitable model for inductive reasoning.
As an example, consider the following two works: [Mah99] and [Mah04]. They are
among the most famous answers to the raven paradox. Using Carnap’s measure
[Car80], in 1999 Maher argued that both NC and PC hold. In 2004 he suggested
a more complex measure that led to opposite results: Maher showed that for this
latter measure, neither NC nor PC holds in all settings. Although Maher’s works
successfully show that at least for one probability measures NC holds and for an-
other probability measures it does not, they do not show whether NC and PC are
generally plausible or not.
The mainstream contemporary Bayesian solutions are not restricted to a partic-
ular measure and in this sense, are more general. According to [FH06] almost all of
them accept PC and argue that observation of a non-black non-raven does provide
evidence in support of H ; however, in comparison with the observation of a black
raven, the amount of confirmation is very small. This difference, they argue, is due
to the fact that the number of ravens is much less than the number of non-black
objects. However as [Vra04] explains, these arguments have only been able to reach
their intended conclusion by adding some extra assumptions about the characteris-
tics of the chosen probability measure. He shows that the standard Bayesian solution
relies on the almost never explicitly defended assumption that “the probability of
H should not be affected by evidence that an object is non-black.” – a supposition
that he believes, is implausible, i.e. may hold or not.
To summarize the above discussion: the general plausibility of a rule of induction
cannot be determined if we restrict our study to particular (objective) background
knowledge or a particular probability measure. On the other hand, no rule of in-
duction holds in the presence of an unrestricted choice of background knowledge
and probability measure. We conclude that rules of induction should be studied for
different classes of background knowledge and priors. If a rule of induction holds
relative to a large class of reasonable background knowledge (i.e. information similar
to our actual configuration of knowledge obtained from observations that often take
place in real life) and relative to reasonable probability measures (i.e. measures that
have intuitively reasonable characteristics e.g. comply with other rules of induction
which are more directly justified by our intuitive notion of induction), then we can
claim that the studied rule is plausible, otherwise we cannot.
In this paper, we study NC with such an approach. In Section 2, we present
a formal representation for three rules of induction, namely, projectability (PJ),
reasoning by analogy (RA) and Nicod’s condition (NC). We also define the form of
background knowledge that is studied throughout the paper. Informally speaking,
we only study pieces of knowledge that do not link the properties of one object to
another object. They can be though of as knowledge that can be gained directly
by observing the properties of some distinct objects. For example, the background
knowledge: “if object a is a raven, then object b is not a raven”, is not of this
form. While one can easily constitute pieces of information that do not have such
a form and violate the aforementioned rules of induction, we have not found any
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illuminating counterexample to the assumption that relative to a piece of information
that does not link properties of distinct objects together, PJ and RA comply with
intuition. In the case of NC, we are more inquiring. In the next two sections, we
study the restrictions of the probability measures that guarantee the validity of NC
relative to two more specific background configurations (that can be expressed in the
mentioned form). In Section 3, we find some sufficient conditions for the validity of
NC and some sufficient conditions for its invalidity, relative to information about the
kind (i.e. being raven or not) and color (i.e. being black or not) of some objects. The
sufficient condition that we present for the validity of NC is less restrictive. However,
this is insufficient for claiming that in this setting NC is generally plausible. Section 4
deals with the setting where the exact number of objects having one property is
known. For example we know how many ravens (or how many non-black objects)
exist. We show that in this setting, measures that comply with Nicod’s condition,
do not always comply with PJ which seems to be the simplest formalization of
inductive inference. It is also shown that in the case of contradiction, intuition
(arguably) follows PJ rather than NC. We think that this result is both interesting
and somewhat surprising and should be considered as a main contribution of this
paper.
One limitation of our basic setup is that it limits us to a universe with an arbitrary
but known size. However, in Section 5, this strong assumption is replaced by the
weaker assumption that there is a probability distribution over the possible sizes of
the universe and this distribution is not affected by an observation of a single object.
We show that under this weaker assumption, the results from the former sections
remain valid.
In Section 6, we summarize the paper and conclude that there is a tension be-
tween NC and our intuitive notion of inductive reasoning. We also suggest that
reasoning by analogy provides a viable alternative to formalize the seemingly in-
tuitive statement that “the observation that a particular object is both F and G
confirms the hypothesis that any object that is F is also G” without suffering form
the shortcomings of NC. All theorems are proven in Section 7.
1.1 Notation, Basic Definitions and Assumptions
Throughout sections 2 to 4 we work with a first-order language L whose only non-
logical symbols are a pair of monadic predicates F and G and a set of constants U
(officially shown as) {u1, u2, . . . , uN} where N is a known positive integer. However,
for simplicity we drop “u” and refer to each constant by its index. We rely on the
domain closure axiom [Rei80], that is:
∀x (x = 1) ∨ (x = 2) ∨ . . . ∨ (x = N) (1.1)
where 1 to N are distinct constants i.e. (1 6= 2) ∧ (1 6= 3) ∧ . . .. Clearly, models
of this axiom are restricted to interpretations with domains containing exactly N
distinct individuals (objects) each of which is denoted by a constant in U . Using
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this bijection between the elements of the domain and constants, we refer to U as
the universe.
Negation, conjunction, disjunction and material implication are respectively rep-
resented by “¬”, “.” (or “∧”), “∨” and “→”. If b is an individual and ψ is a 1-place
predicate (either atomic or a sentential combination of atomic predicates), ψb is
defined as a proposition that involves predicate ψ and indicates: “b has (or satis-
fies or is described by) ψ”. Conjunction of several propositions ψm, ψm+1, . . . , ψn
is abbreviated by ψm:n. By definition, for n < m, ψm:n := ⊤ (i.e. tautology) and
ψm:m := ψm. More generally, if bm to bn are some objects (not necessarily consecu-
tive), ψbm:bn := ψbm∧ . . . ∧ ψbn . The general hypothesis H := (∀x F→Gx) (which is
equivalent to F→G1:N) where F→Gb := Fb → Gb. We also let:
F¯G¯b := ¬Fb.¬Gb; F¯Gb := ¬Fb.Gb; FG¯b := ¬(F→Gb) = Fb.¬Gb; FGb := Fb.Gb
(1.2)
Any of F¯G¯b to FGb defined by relation (1.2) is referred to as a complete description
of an object b.7 For example if F and G represent “ravenhood” and “blackness”
properties respectively, then F¯G¯b means “b is not a raven and is not black” and so
on. F→Gb means “if b is a raven then it is black” and H is the general hypothesis
that “for all b, if b is a raven then it is black”. Clearly all complete descriptions
which provide counterexample to H are in the form FG¯b.
We define ∆ as the set of all propositions ρ which are in the following form (or
by simplification can be converted to it):
ρ := ψ1b1 .ψ
2
b2
. . . . ψkbk =
k∧
x=1
ψxbx (1.3)
where ψ1 to ψk are some predicates in {F , ¬F , G, ¬G, F¯G¯, ¬F¯G¯, F¯G, ¬F¯G, FG¯,
F→G, FG, ¬FG} and b1 to bk are some mutually distinct objects: {b1, b2, . . . bk} ⊆ U .
Note that ∆ is in fact the set of all propositions that do not link the properties
of different objects together. We define the set of all individuals described by ρ
as: Iρ := {b1, b2, . . . bk}. We refer to the set of (simple) predicates involved in ρ
by: Aρ := {ψ
1, . . . , ψk}. For example, the proposition ρ′ := FG1 ∨ FG¯3 is not
in ∆ but ρ′′ := FG1.FG3.F→G4 ∈ ∆ (assuming N ≥ 4). Iρ′′ = {1, 3, 4} and
Aρ′′ = {FG, F→G}. By definition, empty (or tautologous) proposition ⊤ is a member
of ∆ with I⊤ = ∅. Two subsets of ∆ are defined as follows:
δ :=
{
d ∈ ∆ : Ad = {F¯G¯, F¯G, FG}
}
Ω :=
{
d ∈ ∆ : Id = U,Ad = {F¯G¯, F¯G, FG¯, FG}
}
Informally speaking, δ is the set of propositions that completely describe some indi-
viduals and do not falsify H . Likewise, Ω is the set of propositions that completely
7 F¯G¯, F¯G, FG¯ and FG are what Maher calls Q4, Q3, Q2 and Q1 respectively. What we call
complete description, he calls sample proposition [Mah99].
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describe all objects of the universe. We refer to any member of Ω as a Complete
Description Vector (CDV). Note that each CDV corresponds to a unique model or
world (up to isomorphism). In other words, every interpretation that makes a CDV
(and aforementioned axiom (1.1)) true, uniquely determines the value of any sen-
tence in L,8 therefore we can consider them as (representatives of) different worlds.
The probability measures which we are concerned with, are defined over the sam-
ple space Ω with the power set as σ-algebra. No other restriction is imposed on
the choice of measure unless it is mentioned explicitly. For each proposition ρ, let
ωΩρ := {o ∈ Ω : o |= ρ} be the set of all CDVs that entail ρ. We say that the event
ωΩρ corresponds to the proposition ρ (and vice versa). For convenience’ sake, ex-
cept in Section 5, we represent the probability of events by the probability of their
corresponding propositions9; formally, for propositions ρ, we let pr(ρ) := pr(ωΩρ ).
According to Cournot’s principle [Cou43], we do not allow 1 (resp. 0) priors to the
sentences that are not valid (resp. unsatisfiable).
Objective background knowledge (or simply background knowledge) is what we
are certain about and can be represented by a subset of Ω. The more formal defini-
tion of the background setting studied throughout this paper and its corresponding
restrictions are given in Section 2.1.
We equate “inductive support” with “probability increment”: It is said that in
the presence of background knowledge D, evidence E confirms hypothesis H iff:
pr(H|E.D) > pr(H|D)
We are only interested in the case where E and D are consistent, pr(E) and pr(D)
are positive and E is not determined by D, i.e. 0 < pr(E|D) < 1.
2 Inductive Reasoning and Nicod’s Condition
The fundamental assumption behind inductive inference is the so-called principle of
the uniformity of nature [Hum88] (or the immutability of natural processes [Pop59])
based on which, uniformity and trend are more probable than diversity and anomaly
a priori. Let us assume that ∆ is a set of background knowledge configurations for
which we “intuitively” expect that inductive inference holds (for more discussion
refer to Section 2.1). Relative to pieces of information in ∆, we present the following
varieties of inductive inference (i.e. inductive rules):
8 The proof is straightforward. With respect to the domain closure axiom, all quantifiers
are bounded. Therefore all sentences are convertible to quantifier-free forms and consequently
convertible to full disjunctive normal form (DNF) which is in fact a disjunction of some CDVs. In
any world, only one CDV is true, therefore only sentences containing that CDV (when expressed
in full DNF) are true.
9 In Section 5, we simultaneously deal with more than one sample space. While w.r.t. different
sample spaces, propositions may correspond to different events, in that section we directly represent
probability events by their relevant sample space subsets.
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Projectability. For all objects a and b and background knowledge D ∈ ∆ that
does not determine ψa or ψb, based on [Mah04], one (and apparently the simplest)
kind of inductive inference, namely projectability10,11, is defined as follows:
Strong projectability: ∀a, b ∈ U pr(ψb|ψa.D) > pr(ψb|D)
Weak projectability (PJ): ∀a, b ∈ U pr(ψb|ψa.D) ≥ pr(ψb|D) (2.1)
Projectability (relative to predicate ψ) can be justified as follows: The evidence ψa
increases the proportion of the observed individuals that have the predicate ψ. Thus,
according to the principle of the uniformity of nature, the estimated frequency of the
predicate ψ in the total population should also be increased because the uniformity
between the characteristics of the sample and the total population is considered to
be likely.
Reasoning by Analogy (RA). The observation that two individuals have some
common properties, increases the probability that their unobserved properties
are also alike, because it is likely that there is a uniformity between the char-
acteristics of unobserved properties and the observed ones. Maher has formal-
ized one variation of reasoning by analogy (or inference by analogy [Car50]) as:
∀a, b ∈ U pr(Gb|Fb.FGa) > pr(Gb|Fb) [Mah04]. We generalize the relation to cover
the case where background knowledge D ∈ ∆ (that does not determine the value of
Fa, Ga and Gb) is also present:
Reasoning by analogy (RA): ∀a, b ∈ U pr(Gb|Fb.FGa.D) > pr(Gb|Fb.D) (2.2)
Nicod’s Condition (NC). For U := {1, . . . , N}, H := F→G1:N , all a ∈ U and
D ∈ ∆ that does not determine the value of FGa or H , we say NC holds for D iff:
Nicod’s Condition (NC): pr(H|FGa.D) > pr(H|D) (2.3)
NC is stronger than PJ or RA in the sense that it deals with the confirmation of
a generalization rather than a singular prediction. In other words, NC is a form of
enumerative induction but PJ and RA are forms of singular predictive inference.
2.1 Restrictions on the Background Knowledge
Obviously, relative to unconstrained background knowledge, no rule of induction
holds in general. For example, in the presence of background knowledge D′ :=
F1 → (¬F )2:N , at least relative to evidence F1, PJ does not hold. Similarly, (as
10 According to [Car50] predictive inference (i.e. inference from a sample to another sample) is
the most important kind of inference and the most important special kind of it, singular predictive
inference, is inference from a sample to an individual object. Maher’s projectability is in fact a
special kind of singular predictive inference: inference from one individual to another individual.
11Maher’s original relation does not mention background knowledge, and only deals with strong
projectability (which he calls absolute projectability).
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[Mah04], Theorem 12 formally shows), in the presence of background knowledge
D′′ := FG1 → ¬H , NC does not hold (for evidence FG1).
To prevent such problems, the biggest set of background configurations studied
through out this paper is ∆12, which according to its definition in Section 1.1, is the
set of all consistent propositions that can be expressed in the form of a conjunction
of some propositions that involve F , G, F¯G¯, F¯G, FG¯, FG or their negations.
Obviously, each member of ∆ can be expressed in the form of a conjunction
of some propositions each of which describes only one individual. Consequently,
problematic statements that interlink properties of different individuals are not ex-
pressible. As an example, the mentioned pathological examples D′ and D′′ are not
in ∆.
In the case of PJ and RA, we did not find a pathological example in ∆, relative
to which, the rule of induction contradicts intuition. However, in the case of NC it
is already claimed that relative to background knowledge D′′′ := ¬Fa ∈ ∆, it is not
intuitively sound to expect that the evidence F¯G¯a confirms H [FH10]. In Sections
3 and 4, we will investigate the validity of NC relative to two interesting subsets of
∆.
2.2 Restrictions on the probability measure.
In Section 3 (Setting 1), we impose no restriction on the choice of the probability
measure but in Section 4 (Setting 2), we assume that the probability measure is
exchangeable [Car80] in a sense that probabilities are not changed by permuting in-
dividuals (i.e. swapping the name of objects). To introduce this restriction formally,
we need the following definitions:
Definition. By the term permutation, we always refer to a bijection from a set of
all objects U to itself. Throughout this paper, we denote any arbitrary permutation
by pi (or pi′ and pi′′ when we deal with more than one permutation). Having a
proposition ρ, the proposition ρpi is obtained from ρ by replacing any occurrence of
any individual b with pi(b).
Example 1. If U := {1, 2, 3}, the function pi : U → U defined by pi(1) = 1;
pi(2) = 3 and pi(3) = 2, is a permutation with a fixed point 1. For short we write
pi := {2/3; 3/2}. If we define ρ := F1 ∨G3, then ρ
pi = F1 ∨G2. ♦
Exchangeability. The probability measure pr is exchangeable if for all propositions
A and B and all permutations pi, pr(A|B) = pr(Api|Bpi).
12 Note that we do not claim that no background knowledge that is not a member of ∆ is not
plausible. Investigation of rule of inductions relative to such knowledge, is simply beyond the scope
of this paper.
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3 Validity of NC when Background Knowledge
Consists of Complete Descriptions of Some In-
dividuals (Setting 1)
In Section 1.1, δ was defined as the set of all background knowledge that do not refute
H and describe some individuals completely (e.g. in the case of the raven paradox,
members of δ represent the knowledge that we are already aware of the color and
kind (i.e. the state of being raven) of some individuals and none of these known
objects have been a non-black raven). Clearly, δ ⊂ ∆. Theorem 3.1 shows that if
the chosen probability measure satisfies some conditions, then for any background
knowledge D ∈ δ, NC holds (for predicates F and G). On the other hand, Theorem
3.2 shows that under alternative conditions, for some D ∈ δ, NC does not hold.
Theorem 3.1. If a probability measure complies with the following relation:
∀B ∈ ∆, ∀a, b /∈ IB pr(FG¯b|FGa.B) ≤ pr(FG¯b|B) (3.1)
then, for this measure and any D ∈ δ that does not determine FGa or H , NC holds,
i.e. relation (3.1) entails: pr(H|FGa.D) > pr(H|D).
Example 2. If background knowledge consists of complete descriptions of some in-
dividuals, by Theorem 3.1 for all pairs of predicates F and G, the uniform measure
complies with NC since regardless of the interpretation of F and G, for this measure,
∀B ∈ ∆ & ∀a, b /∈ IB pr(FG¯b|FGa.B) = pr(FG¯b|B). This is not surprising since
using this measure, learning is impossible (see [Car50]). This means that no obser-
vation changes the probability of being FG¯ for an unobserved object. Nonetheless,
for this measure NC is valid because any evidence in the form of F¯G¯a, F¯Ga or FGa
confirms H for the simple reason that it removes the possibility that the observed
object (i.e. a) is a counterexample to H . ♦
Example 3. In Carnap’s theory of inductive probability [Car80]:
pr(ψb|E) =
nψ + λ · pr(ψb)
n + λ
In the above relations, n is the number of objects mentioned by evidence E; nψ
is the number of mentioned objects which satisfy predicate ψ, and λ is a constant
measuring the resistance to generalization. Note that b should not be mentioned
by E, i.e. b 6∈ IE . Using this measure and choosing ψ ∈ {F¯G¯, F¯G, FG¯, FG}, in the
presence of background knowledge D ∈ δ such that a, b /∈ ID: pr(FG¯b|FGa.D) =
λ.pr(FG¯b|D)
1+λ
< pr(FG¯b|D). Thus by Theorem 3.1, for the class of background knowl-
edge in the form of conjunction of some F¯G¯, F¯G and/or FG for distinct individuals,
this measure complies with NC. This is equivalent to the setting chosen by [Mah99]
and its corresponding results. ♦
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Theorem 3.2. If a probability measure complies with restrictions (3.2) and (3.3),
then for this measure (and predicates F and G) and background knowledge D ∈ δ,
NC does not hold.
∀B∈∆, ∀a, b /∈ IB pr(FG¯b|FGa.B) > pr(FG¯b|B) (3.2)
∀a /∈ID pr(¬F→Ga|F→Gb1: bn .D) < pr(FG¯b1 |FGa.D)− pr(FG¯b1 |D)
(3.3)
In the above relations a 6= b and b1 to bn represent an arbitrary enumeration of all
individuals (except a) that are not mentioned by D (that is, ID = U\{b1 . . . bn, a}).
According to restriction (3.3), the probability that a is not F→G given that all
other objects in the universe are F→G should be less than the degree of confirmation
by evidence FGa of a hypothesis that an unobserved object b1 is FG¯. Note that b1
can be the index of any unobserved object.
Example 4. [Mah04] proposes a measure based on the formula:
pr(FG¯b|E) = pr(I) ·
nF + λ · pr(Fb)
n+ λ
·
nG + λ · pr(¬Gb)
n+ λ
+ pr(¬I) ·
nFG¯ + λ · pr(FG¯b)
n+ λ
In the above relation, n is the number of objects mentioned by E; nF and nG denote
the number of mentioned objects which are F and ¬G respectively.
In this expression, the prior probability of FG¯ i.e. pr(FG¯b) has to be equal to pr(Fb) ·
pr(¬Gb) and pr(I) and λ are parameters. Maher proposes a counterexample for NC
where N = 2 (Let U := {a, b}), λ = 2, pr(I) = 0.5 and prior probabilities are
pr(Fb) = 0.001 and pr(Gb) = 0.1. This conclusion can be confirmed independently
by Theorem 3.2 as follows:
1. For these parameters, the only member of ∆ that does not contain a and b, is
B = ∅ for which relation (3.2) holds if pr(Fb) < 0.25.
2. By assuming:
(
pr(FG¯b|FGa)−pr(FG¯b)
)
≥ 0.06 and pr(Gb) = 0.1, a cumbersome
calculation shows that (for empty background knowledge) relation (3.3) holds if:
pr(Fb) < 0.0983 which covers Maher’s proposed configuration. ♦
Comparing Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 shows that creating a probability measure that
contradicts NC (w.r.t. D ∈ δ) is harder than making a measure that complies with
it (for the same background setting) because the former measure has to satisfy more
constraints. The reason is that even if in a measure, evidence E := FGa does not
affect the probability of FG¯ for unobserved objects (as in the case of the uniform
distribution), every hypothesis that is not refuted by E (including H) is confirmed
by it since the observation has reduced the number of possible counterexamples
by one. On the other hand, in the case of a measure that does not comply with
NC, not only should E confirm FG¯ for unobserved objects, but the effect of this
confirmation should be so substantial that it overwhelms the effect of the elimination
of one counterexample to H .13 However, in the case where the size of the universe
13 To see how the effect of elimination of one possible counterexample leads to relation (3.3),
refer to the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Section 7.
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is large, the latter effect should be minute. This is reflected in relation (3.3) as
follows: If N is large, then at least for measures that comply with projectability,
pr(¬F→Ga|F→Gb1: bn .D) ≈ 0, because if it is known that all objects in the universe
except a are F→G, then it should be quite probable that a is F→G too. Therefore,
even if the degree of confirmation of FG¯b1 by evidence FGa (i.e. pr(FG¯b1|FGa.D)−
pr(FG¯b1 |D)) is very small
14 , relation (3.3) holds.15 To summarize:
• If regardless of the choice of background knowledge, an observation Fa.Ga does
not confirm that any unobserved individual is an F that is not G, then relative
to any background knowledge in δ, NC holds.
• If regardless of the choice of background knowledge, an observation Fa.Ga con-
firms that any unobserved individual is an F that is not G, and on the other
hand, the effect of elimination of one counterexample via an observation is
negligible, then relative to any background knowledge in δ, NC does not hold.
The above statements delegate the assessment of NC (a form of enumerative induc-
tion) to the assessment of expressions which deal with singular predictions. Hence,
a new perspective on the nature of NC is provided: Should regardless of the in-
terpretation of F and G, (the observation of) an F that is G disconfirm that any
unobserved object is F but not G?
For example, relative to background knowledge and a probability measure
that reflect our actual configuration of knowledge, should the observation of an
F=“walnut” that is G=“round” decrease the probability that any unobserved ob-
ject is a walnut but not round? Indeed yes; therefore by Theorem 3.1, in this
case and for these predicates, NC holds. Should the observation of an F=“round”,
G=“walnut” decrease the probability that any unobserved object is “round” but
not a “walnut”? Arguably not.
Should the observation of an F=“ogre” which is G=“old” decrease the probability
that we might encounter an ogre which is not old? Definitely not! 16 Therefore, in
14 Note that by relation (3.2), this degree of confirmation is positive.
15 Here is another justification for the above argument: By definition, a probability measure
defined over a first-order language with an infinite domain is Gaifman iff the probability of
the generalization of any predicate (in our case, F→G) is equal to the probability of the con-
junction of some positive instances when their number tends to infinity [GS82] or alternatively,
pr(∀x ψx|ψ1:n)
n→∞
−−−−→ 1 (see [HLNU13] thm. 27) and consequently pr(¬ψa|ψ1:n)
n→∞
−−−−→ 0. Since
the Gaifman condition is what we intuitively expect from generalization over an infinite universe,
it can be considered as a very simple and intuitive rule of induction. In our case, if the universe was
infinite and the measure was assumed to be Gaifman, inequality (3.3) would always hold. However
we have assumed that the universe is finite therefore we cannot remove this inequality. What we
can say is that for very large domains, relation (3.3) is a very weak condition.
16 This confirmation asymmetry may be due to possible asymmetry in background knowledge
and/or prior possibilities of different predicates. For example according to our actual configuration
of knowledge, the prior probability of “being an ogre” (for any individual) is quite low. This is a key
point in the existing arguments: Good’s baby [Goo68] (that assigns low probability to ravenhood)
and Maher’s unicorn [Mah04]. But unlike our discussion, these arguments do not reduce the
assessment of NC to a singular prediction.
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this case, we are intuitively using a probability measure that satisfies the condition
(3.2). Now assume that we have seen all objects of the world except one. It has
happened that any observed object that has been an ogre has been old as well. Is it
reasonable to believe that it is improbable that the last unobserved object is a young
ogre? If yes, then our intuitive measure also complies with restriction (3.3), hence
by Theorem 3.2, by this denotation for F and G, plausible probability measures do
not comply with Nicod’s condition.
4 NC vs. PJ when the Number of Objects having
One Predicate is Known (Setting 2)
This section studies NC in the presence of a completely different background setting
where we know that exactly k individuals are F (e.g. ravens) and the rest are not
F , but we do not know anything about the other property (e.g. their color).
First we focus on a simpler setting where we know exactly which objects are F
and which objects are not F (e.g. we know that objects 1 to k are F and the rest of
the universe i.e. objects k + 1 to N are not F ).
Theorem 4.1. For U := {1, 2, . . .N} and D := F1:k.(¬F )k+1:N , weak projectability
(PJ) entails:
pr(H |Gk . D) > pr(H|D) (4.1)
pr(H |GN . D) ≥ pr(H|D) (4.2)
pr(H | ¬GN . D) ≤ pr(H|D) (4.3)
and reasoning by analogy (RA) entails:17
pr(H |Gk . D) > pr(H|D) (4.4)
Next, we show that these results are valid in the general setting where the back-
ground knowledge is such that we only know the exact number of objects being F
but we do not know their names. In other words, we know that exactly one com-
bination of k out of N objects of the universe are F but we do not know which
combination. But before that, we should formalize such knowledge in the form of
an event (i.e. a subset of the sample space).
Definition. CU,k := {C : C ⊆ U, |C| = k} is defined as the set of all (distinct)
subsets of U which contain exactly k individuals. Obviously, the cardinality of CU,k
is
(
N
k
)
.
17 Therefore, in this setting both PJ and RA suggest thatH := ∀b F→Gb is confirmed by evidence
Gk but RA provides no answer whether or not evidence GN should confirm (or disconfirm) H . The
reason is that (as the proof of the theorem which is provided in Section 7 shows) in the presence
of background knowledge F1:k.(¬F )k+1:N , validity of H only depends on property G of objects 1
to k that do not have a common property with object N .
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Example 5. Given U := {1, 2, 3, 4}, CU,2 =
{
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4},
{3, 4}
}
. ♦
Definition. For 1 ≤ k ≤ N , “Exactly k objects of the universe U are F” is formally
defined as follows:
Exact(k, U, F ) :=
∨
C∈CU,k
( ∧
b′∈C
Fb′ .
∧
b′′ 6∈C
¬Fb′′
)
(4.5)
Example 6. In the previous example, Exact(2, U, F ) = (F1.F2.¬F3.¬F4) ∨
(F1.F3.¬F2.¬F4) ∨ (F1.F4.¬F2.¬F3) ∨ (F2.F3.¬F1.¬F4) ∨
(F2.F4.¬F1.¬F3) ∨ (F3.F4.¬F3.¬F4). ♦
By comparing definition (4.5) with the definition of ∆, it becomes clear that for
1 < k < N , Exact(k, U, F ) 6∈ ∆, therefore we do not expect that in the presence
of such background knowledge, rules of induction hold in general and they actually
don’t. For instance, knowing that exactly k objects are F , the evidence that a
particular object is F , confirms that any other object is not F ,18 which contradicts
PJ:
(intuitively): ∀b 6= a ∈ U pr
(
Fb|Fa.Exact(k, U, F )
)
< pr
(
Fb|Exact(k, U, F )
)
However, the following theorem shows that for the hypothesis that we are inter-
ested in i.e. H := ∀b F→Gb, the background knowledge Exact(k, U, F ) is equivalent
to F1:k.¬Fk+1:N which is a member of ∆. Therefore, in the case of the raven para-
dox and background knowledge Exact(k, U, F ), the rules of induction (that are
assumed to hold relative to background knowledge in ∆) should still hold.
Theorem 4.2. If U = {1, . . . , N} and a is an arbitrary member of U and assuming
that a probability measure pr is exchangeable:
pr
(
H|Exact(k, U, F )
)
= pr
(
H|F1:k.¬Fk+1:N
)
(4.6)
pr
(
H|Exact(k, U, F ).Fa.Ga
)
= pr
(
H|F1:k.¬Fk+1:N .Gk
)
(4.7)
pr
(
H|Exact(k, U, F ).¬Fa.Ga
)
= pr
(
H|F1:k.¬Fk+1:N .GN
)
(4.8)
pr
(
H|Exact(k, U, F ).¬Fa.¬Ga
)
= pr
(
H|F1:k.¬Fk+1:N .¬GN
)
(4.9)
The formal proof of this theorem is presented in Section 7.3, but the following
simple example shows the main idea behind the general proof.
Example 7. Having U := {1, 2, 3}, we show that:
pr
(
H|Exact(2, U, F ).F3.G3
)
= pr
(
H|F1.F2.¬F3.G2
)
(that is relation (4.7) for a :=
18 Suppose that you are in a camp populated by 100 captives, and it is known that 10 of them
will be chosen randomly to be executed; Whenever someone except you is chosen, it is reasonable
to be more optimist about your fate, for the simple reason that 9
99
< 10
100
.
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3 and k := 2) as follows:
pr
(
Exact(2, U, F ).F3.G3|H
)
= pr
(
(F1.F2.¬F3 ∨ F1.F3.¬F2 ∨ F2.F3.¬F1).(F3.G3)|F→G1.F→G2.F→G3
)
, by def.
= pr(F1.F3.¬F2.G3 ∨ F2.F3.¬F1.G3|F→G1.F→G2.F→G3), by simplification
= pr(F1.F3.¬F2.G3|F→G1.F→G2.F→G3) + pr(F2.F3.¬F1.G3|F→G1.F→G2.F→G3),
by σ-additivity of disjoint events (3rd Kolmogorov probability axiom)
= pr(F1.F2.¬F3.G2|F→G1.F→G3.F→G2) + pr(F1.F2.¬F3.G2|F→G3.F→G1.F→G2),
by exchangeability assumption, using premutation pi′ := {3/2; 2/3}
on the first term and pi′′ := {3/2; 1/3; 2/1} on the second term
= 2 · pr(F1.F2.¬F3.G2|H)
Similarly it can easily be shown that:
pr
(
Exact(2, U, F ).F3.G3
)
= 2 · pr
(
F1.F2.¬F3.G2
)
. Therefore by Bayes rule:
pr
(
H|Exact(2, U, F ).F3.G3
)
=
pr
(
H
)
· pr
(
Exact(2, U, F )|H
)
pr
(
Exact(2, U, F )
)
=
2 · pr(H) · pr(F1.F2.¬F3.G2|H)
2 · pr(F1.F2.¬F3.G2)
= pr(H|F1.F2.¬F3.G2)
which is what we wanted to show by this example. ♦
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 directly entail the main theorem of this section:
Theorem 4.3. If Exact(k, U, F ) := “exactly k objects (of the universe U) are
F” and a ∈ U is an object, and the probability measure pr is exchangeable, weak
projectability (PJ) entails:
pr
(
H |Exact(k, U, F ).Fa.Ga
)
> pr
(
H |Exact(k, U, F )
)
(4.10)
pr
(
H |Exact(k, U, F ).¬Fa.Ga
)
≥ pr
(
H |Exact(k, U, F )
)
(4.11)
pr
(
H |Exact(k, U, F ).¬Fa.¬Ga
)
≤ pr
(
H |Exact(k, U, F )
)
(4.12)
and reasoning by analogy (RA) assumption entails:
pr
(
H |Exact(k, U, F ).Fa.Ga
)
> pr
(
H |Exact(k, U, F )
)
(4.13)
The above relations seem to be compatible with intuition. While the total num-
ber of objects that satisfy F is known in advance, the consideration of Fa or ¬Fa
should not affect our estimation of the frequency of the objects being F . On the
other hand, the probability of G can still be affected by observations. Therefore,
assuming PJ, consideration of Ga increases the probability of G and consequently
decreases the probability of FG¯. As a result it seems reasonable that the evidence
Ga confirms H = (¬FG¯)1:N , and the evidence ¬Ga disconfirms it.
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Moreover, an observation Fa.Ga has an extra effect: While it is known that only
k objects can be counterexamples to H (because in order to be FG¯, one should
be F ), the observation Fa.Ga decreases the number of possible counterexamples by
one. This holds even in the case where the chosen measure is such that inductive
reasoning is not possible (e.g. the uniform measure is used). Consequently, in (4.10)
inequality is strict, but in (4.11) and (4.12) it is not. Theorem (4.3) implies the
following results:
Corollary 4.4. If F := raven and G := black, according to relation (4.10) (or 4.13),
PJ (or RA) leads to:
pr(H| (exactly k objects are ravens).(a specific object is raven and black)) >
pr(H|exactly k objects are ravens)
Corollary 4.5. If F := nonBlack & G := nonRaven w.r.t. relation (4.10) (or 4.13),
PJ (or RA) leads to:
pr(H|(exactly k objects are not black).(a specific object is nonBlack and nonRaven))
> pr(H| exactly k objects are not black)
Corollary 4.6. If F := raven and G := black, w.r.t. (4.11), PJ leads to:
pr(H|(exactly k objects are ravens).(a specific object is nonRaven and black)) ≥
pr(H|exactly k individuals are ravens)
Corollary 4.7. If F :=nonBlack & G:=nonRaven w.r.t. (4.11), PJ leads to:
pr(H|(exactly k individuals are not black).(a specific object is black and not raven))
≥ pr(H|exactly k individuals are not black)
Corollary 4.8. If F := raven and G := black, w.r.t. (4.12), PJ leads to:
pr(H|(exactly k individuals are ravens).(a specific object is not raven and not black))
≤ pr(H|exactly k individuals are ravens)
Corollary 4.9. If F := nonBlack & G := nonRaven, w.r.t. (4.12), PJ leads to:
pr(H|(exactly k individuals are not black).(a specific object is black and raven)) ≤
pr(H|exactly k individuals are not black)
Corollaries (4.4) to (4.9) are summarized in (Table 1). NC, if assumed to hold in this
setting, suggests that the observation of a non-black non-raven and the observation
of a black raven (i.e. entries in the first and fourth rows of the table) should confirm
H which clearly contradicts what PJ suggests, therefore, there is a tension between
these two rules. When background knowledge is neglected, intuition goes with PJ
in the first column of the table. On the other hand, it does not completely match
the suggestions of either NC or PC in the second column. This may indicate that
intuition is more inclined to the case where “the number of ravens” and not “the
number of non-blacks” is known in advance. In real life, none of these numbers
is known but the total number of ravens can be estimated much easier than the
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no. of the ravens is known no. of non-blacks is known
observation of a PJ: doesn’t confirm H (Cor. 4.8) PJ: confirms H (Cor. 4.5)
non-black NC: confirms H NC: confirms H
non-raven RA: n/a RA: confirms H (Cor. 4.5)
observation of a
evidence refutes H evidence refutes H
non-black raven
PJ: doesn’t disconfirm H PJ: doesn’t disconfirm H
observation of a (Corollary 4.6) (Corollary 4.7)
black non-raven NC: n/a NC: n/a
RA: n/a RA: n/a
PJ: confirms H (Corollary 4.4) PJ: does not confirm H
observation of a (Corollary 4.9)
black raven NC: confirms H NC: confirms H
RA: confirms H (Corollary 4.4) RA: n/a
Table 1: Weak projectability (PJ) vs. Nicod’s condition (NC) and reasoning by
analogy (RA) in setting 2.
number of non-black objects. On the other hand, if we are explicitly informed of the
total number of non-black objects, at least in cases similar to the following example,
intuition seems to follow PJ’s suggestions in the second column:
Imagine that you are only concerned about objects which are placed inside a bag
(i.e. U := set of objects inside a bag). Also imagine that you are told that only 4
objects are not black. In this case, there are just four possible counterexamples to H .
Now suppose that a green apple comes out of the bag. Since it is green, it is one of
those 4 non-blacks. Therefore, one possible counterexample is removed. Meanwhile,
the fact that it is a non-raven may increase the probability of non-ravenhood (w.r.t.
PJ). Therefore it is more probable that the 3 remaining non-blacks are also non-
raven. Thus, this observation should confirm H . Now suppose that a black raven
comes out. Its color informs us that it is not among the possible counterexamples
but its kind increases the probability of ravenhood which is not in favor of H . So,
this observation cannot confirm H . Therefore, this example suggests that in Setting
2, given the proper background knowledge, intuition does not follow NC. It follows
PJ even if it advises that the observation of a green apple confirms that “all ravens
are black” and the observation of a black raven does not!
Clearly, we can never “prove” that a particular measure or a particular proposi-
tion is (or is not) “intuitively plausible”, due to the subjective nature of the problem.
The former example presented a particular method of reasoning that relative to a
given configuration supports PJ more than NC. This has convinced us that gener-
ally in setting 2, PJ is more plausible than NC but as we mentioned, some people
might not be convinced. For example, one might argue that if we are told that the
number of non-black objects is precisely 7 million, we can still believe that black
ravens confirm that all ravens are black. Such reasoning might be on grounds of
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some “hidden” background information such as knowing that ravens are animals
and animals of the same kind often have similar colors. This particular background
knowledge is not in ∆ (and therefore not in Setting 2) however as it was mentioned
in the introduction, this knowledge is convertible to the subjectively chosen a priori
probability measure. Of course given such knowledge, there will be no surprise if NC
holds for F :=raven and G:=black but not for F := non-black and G:= non-raven.
However, it is up to the readers to judge about what is intuitive for them and what
is not. What was formally provable (and is proved formally) is that in setting 2, no
probability measure can simultaneously satisfy PJ and NC for a couple of predicates
F and G.
Reasoning by analogy vs. Nicod’s condition: Table 1 clearly shows that the
only cases where PJ and NC do not contradict is when according to RA, the general
hypothesis H should be confirmed. In other cases, RA do not impose a restriction;
therefore, it never contradicts either PJ or NC.
A little thought reveals that RA and NC have many commonalities. We go a
step further and propose a conjecture that NC may seem intuitively valid since it
can easily be conflated with RA as follows:
According to the informal definition of NC: “The observation of an F that is
G confirms that all F are G (or any F is G).” Although this informal statement
seems to be plausible a priori, it is vague and NC is not necessarily its only possible
formalization. To begin with, it should be noticed that in informal language, the
scopes of quantifiers are often ambiguous; For example the informal expression “for
all b, the probability of ψb . . . ” can easily be mistaken for “the probability that for
all b, ψb”. However the most suitable formalization of the former (i.e. ∀b pr(ψb))
differs from that of the latter (i.e. pr(∀b ψb)). On the other hand, the informal “if”
does not exclusively stand for material implication; in a proper context it can also
mean conditional probability. Putting these together, it can be seen that:
(Informal NC): “The observation of an object a which is both F and G confirms
that all (or any) object b that is F is also G.”
can alternatively be formalized as: ∀b pr(Gb |Fb.Fa.Ga) > pr(Gb |Fb). This rela-
tion is the definition of RA (see relation 2.2) – a rule of induction which is used in
many fields (e.g. in case-based reasoning [AP94]), is directly justified by the principle
of the uniformity of nature and does not suffer from the shortcomings of NC such as
contradicting PJ or producing counterintuitive conclusions such as PC in the raven
paradox.
5 When the Size of the Universe is Unknown
In Section 1.1, we defined our probability space using the sample space Ω, the set
of all complete description vectors (CDVs), all involving N objects. Thus, from the
beginning, we had to assume that the cardinality of the universe is known. In this
section, we instead assume that:
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1. The size of the universe (i.e. N) is unknown; however it is known that it is
fixed and bounded by some known constants α and β. E.g. assume it is known
that the number of the objects of the universe is larger than α = 1010 and less
than β = 101000.
2. The new evidence E := Fa.Ga, does not affect the way the rational agent
estimates the size of the universe. E.g., the observation of a black raven does
not change the probability distribution over the possible sizes of the universe.
We show that in this setting, our previous conclusions are still valid. Informally
speaking, the reason is that all (in)equalities of the previous sections hold for any
arbitrary (but fixed) size of the universe, therefore this number does not play a role,
and consequently, even if it is unknown, (as long as new evidence does not affect
the agent’s beliefs about it) all (qualitative) relations should still hold.
To justify this claim formally, we need some new notation:
If it is known that the size of universe is υ, we let the enumeration of its objects
be Uυ := {1, 2, . . . υ} (created recursively by Uυ := Uυ−1 ⊔ {υ}).
19 Instead of ∆,
we write ∆υ to indicate that the members of this set describe individuals which
belong to the universe Uυ. Similarly, instead of Ω, we write Ωυ to emphasize that
the sample space corresponds to a universe of size υ (i.e. Uυ).
20 Similarly, instead of
pr(·), we write prυ(·) to indicate that by definition, prυ (defined on Ωυ) is a measure
that provides a probabilistic model for the rational agent (who performs induction),
only if he/she/it knows the cardinality of the universe is υ.
To prevent ambiguity, instead of representing the events by propositions, we di-
rectly use subsets of the sample spaces: The event that corresponds to an arbitrary
proposition ρ relative to a sample space Ωυ is: ω
Ωυ
ρ := {o ∈ Ωυ : o |= ρ}. For exam-
ple, if ρ := F1, then ω
Ω1
ρ represents the event {FG¯1,FG1}, while ω
Ω2
ρ stands for the
event {FG¯1F¯G¯2, FG¯1F¯G2, FG¯1FG¯2, . . ., FG1FG2}. The Complete Description
Vectors (CDVs) are here bold-faced and conjunction symbols “.” are dropped to
emphasize that they are not ordinary propositions. For example FG1FG2 is a CDV
that not only entails the ordinary proposition FG1.FG2, but also indicates that the
universe is U2 = {1, 2}. The reason is that by definition, each CDV describes all
objects of the universe (see Section 1.1).
Let α and β be some known lower and upper bound for the size of the universe.21
We define a new sample space Ωα:β as a set that contains all members of all sample
spaces that correspond to universes with sizes at least equal to α and at most equal
to β:
∀α, β ∈ N s.t. α ≤ β Ωα:β :=
β⊔
υ=α
Ωυ (5.1)
19 Note that ‘⊔’ denotes the disjoint union operation.
20 While Ωυ contains CDVs that exactly describe υ objects, for all distinct υ
′ and υ′′, Ωυ′∩Ωυ′′=∅.
21 α is at least equal to the number objects mentioned by background knowledge or evidence. β
can be arbitrarily large but for simplicity, we assume that it is finite. To see what would be needed
if we wanted to allow β →∞, refer to Footnote 23.
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Relative to the sample space Ωα:β and for all υ ∈ [α, β], the subset Ωυ represents
the event that “the size of the universe is υ”. We let:
ωρ := {o ∈ Ωα:β : o |= ρ} =
β⊔
υ=α
{o ∈ Ωυ : o |= ρ} =
β⊔
υ=α
ωΩυρ =
β⊔
υ=α
(ωΩυρ ∩ Ωυ)
ωρ corresponds to the event that regardless of the size of the universe, proposition ρ
holds.22 We refer to ωρ as the generalized correspondent of ρ. While ω
Ωυ
ρ ⊆ Ωυ and
for all υ′ 6= υ′′, Ωυ′ ∩ Ωυ′′ = ∅, the above relation entails:
ωΩυρ = ωρ ∩ Ωυ (5.2)
Likewise, the event that represents “exactly k objects of a universe of unknown size
(but bounded by α and β) are F” is defined as follows:
ωExact(k,F ) :=
β⊔
υ=α
ωΩυ
Exact(k,Uυ,F )
=
β⊔
υ=α
(ωΩυ
Exact(k,Uυ,F )
∩ Ωυ)
We refer to ωExact(k,F ) as the generalized correspondent of Exact(k, Uα, F ) to
Exact(k, Uβ, F ).
Over the sample space Ωα:β, we let Pr denote the probability measure that ex-
plains the rational agent ’s a priori degrees of beliefs in the events. As mentioned
in footnote (1), the existence of such a measure is deduced from the rationality
axioms23 [Sav54]. Note that:
∀ω ⊆ Ωα:β , ∀υ ∈ N s.t. α ≤ υ ≤ β Pr(ω |Ωυ) = prυ(ω) (5.3)
The reason is that by definition, both sides of the above equation represent the
probability measure chosen by the rational agent, when the size of the universe is
known to be i.24
Let E := Fa.Ga where a ∈ Uα (consequently for all υ ≥ α, a ∈ Uυ), and ωD
be either the generalized correspondent of Exact(k, Uα, F ) to Exact(k, Uβ, F ) or
the generalized correspondent of any D ∈ ∆α. Roughly speaking, this means that
ωD is the generalized correspondent of any piece of background knowledge which is
discussed in the previous sections. Based on these notations, relation (5.4) represents
a formal version of Assumption (2) (i.e. the assumption that the estimated size of
the universe is not affected by evidence E):
(Assumption) ∀υ ∈ [α, β] s.t. Pr(Ωυ) > 0 Pr(Ωυ |ωE ∩ ωD) = Pr(Ωυ |ωD) (5.4)
22 More specifically, ωρ represents: “N=α and ρ w.r.t. Uα” or “N=α+1 and ρ w.r.t. Uα+1” or
. . . or “N=β and ρ w.r.t. Uβ”.
23 For the case where Ωα:β is finite, Savages axioms are sufficient. If we wanted to study the
case where it is infinite (i.e. no upper bound exists: β → ∞), we needed to add the monotone
continuity assumption [Arr70] to the rationality axioms to guarantee countable additivity.
24 Evidently, if Pr(Ωυ) = 0, both Pr(ω |Ωυ) and prυ(ω) are undefined.
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Having this setting, it is easy to show that all (in)equalities of the previous
sections hold for the case where the exact number of objects in the universe is
unknown. As an example, consider the relation (5.5). This is a typical inequality
that informally speaking states that “for any possible universe-size υ, if it is known
that the size of the universe is equal to υ, relative to background knowledge D, the
evidence E confirms the hypothesis H .” (Note that by the notation that we were
using in the previous sections, this equation would be represented by pr(H|E.D) >
pr(H|D) where the size of the universe was not mentioned explicitly.)
∀υ ∈ N s.t. α ≤ υ ≤ β, Pr(Ωυ) > 0 prυ(ω
Ωυ
H |ω
Ωυ
E ∩ ω
Ωυ
D ) > prυ(ω
Ωυ
H |ω
Ωυ
D ) (5.5)
Proposition 5.1 proves that the mentioned typical inequality entails that:
Pr(ωH |ωE ∩ ωD) > Pr(ωH |ωD), which informally speaking asserts that relative to
a universe of an unknown size (that is bounded by α and β), in the presence of
background knowledge D, the evidence E confirms H .
Proposition 5.1. Let the size of the universe be unknown but known to be bounded
by α and β. Let Pr be a probability measure that corresponds to the degrees of
beliefs of a rational agent in the events of the sample space Ωα:β , defined by relation
(5.1). If Pr complies with relation (5.4), then relation (5.5) entails:
Pr(ωH |ωE ∩ ωD) > Pr(ωH |ωD)
Proof. Let S := {s ∈ N : α ≤ s ≤ β, Pr(Ωs) > 0} be the set of all possible sizes of
the universe.
∀υ ∈ S prυ(ω
Ωυ
H |ω
Ωυ
E ∩ ω
Ωυ
D ) > prυ(ω
Ωυ
H |ω
Ωυ
D ), by (5.5) and definition of S
⇒ ∀υ ∈ S Pr(ωΩυH |ω
Ωυ
E ∩ ω
Ωυ
D ∩ Ωυ) > Pr(ω
Ωυ
H |ω
Ωυ
D ∩ Ωυ), by relation (5.3)
⇒ ∀υ ∈ S Pr
(
ωH∩Ωυ | (ωE∩Ωυ)∩(ωD∩Ωυ)∩Ωυ
)
> Pr
(
ωH∩Ωυ | (ωD∩Ωυ)∩Ωυ
)
,
by relation (5.2)
⇒ ∀υ ∈ S Pr(ωH |ωE ∩ ωD ∩ Ωυ) > Pr(ωH |ωD ∩ Ωυ), by simplification
⇒ ∀υ ∈ S Pr(Ωυ |ωE∩ωD)·Pr(ωH |ωE∩ωD∩Ωυ) > Pr(Ωυ |ωD)·Pr(ωH |ωD∩Ωυ),
by multiplying the r.h.s. and l.h.s. by the r.h.s. and l.h.s. of relation (5.4)
⇒
∑
υ∈S
Pr(Ωυ |ωE∩ωD) ·Pr(ωH |ωE∩ωD∩Ωυ) >
∑
υ∈S
Pr(Ωυ |ωD) ·Pr(ωH |ωD∩Ωυ)
The above inequality is equivalent to Pr(ωH |ωE ∩ ωD) > Pr(ωH |ωD) (where Ωυ is
marginalized out), which is the intended result.
6 Conclusion
We argued that from a Bayesian perspective, (a) objective background information
(from previous observations) and subjective prior information (i.e. prior degrees of
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beliefs) can produce the same effects and in this sense, are convertible; therefore, in
this context, “the state of perfect ignorance” should be interpreted as “the state of
possessing no objective information and no subjective biased beliefs”. On the other
hand, if we assume that the uniform probability measure corresponds to unbiased
subjective degrees of beliefs (as it is often assumed), then we should conclude that:
(b) with unbiased subjective beliefs, inductive reasoning is impossible. Therefore,
based on (a) and (b), induction in a condition of perfect ignorance is impossible.
In addition, by examples we have shown that relative to unrestricted objec-
tive/subjective prior information, common rules of induction do not always hold.
We concluded that rules of induction should be considered plausible, if they hold
relative to a large class of plausible (objective) background knowledge (i.e. knowl-
edge similar to our actual background knowledge) and plausible probability measures
(i.e. measures with reasonable characteristics such as complying with more intuitive
rules of induction). Subsequently, we scrutinized the plausibility of NC by fixing
the background knowledge and studying the characteristics of measures that do or
do not comply with it.
In the first setting, the background knowledge is composed of complete descrip-
tions of several objects. It is shown that in this setting, validity of NC is implied
by the answer to a simpler question that does not seem to have a general intuitive
answer i.e. for distinct objects a and b, whether E = Fa.Ga confirms Fb.¬Gb or not.
While due to the chosen probability measure and characteristics of F and G, the
latter condition does not hold in general, we concluded that in this setting NC is
not significantly more reasonable than ¬NC.
In the second setting, the number of objects satisfying a particular predicate is
known by background knowledge. It is shown that in this case, NC may contradict
PJ while seemingly, intuition follows the latter. In summary:
1. There are reasonable (i.e. not implausible a priori) probability measures for
which NC does not hold;
2. There are reasonable probability measures for which weak projectability, i.e.
one of the simplest forms of inductive inference, opposes NC;
3. In the case of contradiction, intuition “seems to” follow projectability rather
than NC;
Hence, we conclude that we have gathered some evidence against the assumption
that NC is a generally reliable rule of induction. If NC is not considered plausible
then the raven paradox is also dispelled since even if NC holds for two predicates F
and G, it does not mean that it should hold for ¬G and ¬F . This asymmetry may
be due to possible asymmetry in background knowledge and/or priors.
Of the three mentioned points, point (1) had already been demonstrated [Mah04].
The distinction is that we have dealt with NC without relying on any particular a
priori measure. As mentioned throughout the paper, in the Bayesian framework
one’s choice of prior probability distribution is subjective. Nevertheless, Bayesian
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agents’ beliefs at any time are (heavily) dependent on their prior distributions.
Therefore, different subjective choices may lead to contradictory results. In the case
of variations of Carnap’s measure, this freedom of choice also resurfaces in the form
of one or several arbitrary parameters. [Mah99] and [Mah04] are two variations of
Carnap’s measure but for the former, NC always holds and for the latter, for some
parameter configurations, it does not. Although one might claim that the existence
of at least one measure that does not comply with NC is sufficient to discredit NC,
one should note that any rule of induction can be violated by some measures and
remains valid for some others. In fact one might contrarily claim that contradiction
of a measure with an “intuitive” rule of induction should discredit that particular
measure rather than the rule. Therefore, our sufficient condition for (¬NC) that
covers a class of measures rather than a specific one, should be considered a more
general and interesting relation.
The main contribution of our work is the conjunction of points (2) and (3).
We believe that compared to the raven paradox’s PC and other counterintuitive
consequences of NC, the conflict between NC and PJ is more important. To our
knowledge, other counterintuitive consequences (such as The red herring [Goo67]
and Good’s baby [Goo68] problems) are either related to arguably implausible back-
ground configurations, or as is the case with PC, some claim that they are not
counterintuitive. PJ is a very simple form of inductive inference. It is more directly
justified by our intuitive notion of inductive reasoning than NC, and it’s plausibility
cannot be challenged as easily.
We also proposed a conjecture that NC seems to be plausible because it can
be mistaken for reasoning by analogy (RA) which has a closely related informal
representation. We proved that in the case where the exact number of objects
satisfying one property is known, RA is compatible with both PJ and NC. It is
a conservative condition that intuitively seems plausible and does not suffer from
the shortcomings of NC (such as contradicting PJ or producing counterintuitive
conclusions such as PC) and is directly justified by the principle of the uniformity
of nature.
7 Proof of Theorems
7.1 Proof of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2
Lemma 1. In relation (2.3), if D ∈ δ, NC is equivalent to Ξ1 · Ξ2 > 1 where:
U\ID := {b1, . . . bn, a} is “the set of objects not described by D”,
Ξ1 :=
pr(F→Gb1:bn |FGa.D)
pr(F→Gb1:bn |D)
and Ξ2 :=
1
pr(F→Ga|F→Gb1:bn .D)
.
Proof. Objects are either completely described by D ∈ δ or are not described at all.
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Therefore:
pr(F→G1:N |D) = pr(F→Gb1:bn .F→Ga|D) (7.1)
pr(F→G1:N |FGa.D) = pr(F→Gb1:bn |FGa.D) (7.2)
Combination of (7.1), (7.2) and (2.3) proves the lemma.25
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Due to pr(FG¯b|·) = 1−pr(F→Gb|·), relation (3.1) is equal
to:
∀B ∈ ∆, ∀a, b /∈ IB pr(F→Gb|FGa.B) ≥ pr(F→Gb|B) (7.3)
Let arbitrary D ∈ δ and ID = U\{b1, . . . , bn, a} (i.e. b1 to bn are the objects not
mentioned by background knowledge or evidence). According to the definitions
of δ and ∆, for all i < n: F→Gb1. . . F→Gbi .D ∈ ∆ (because it is consistent) and
a, bi+1 /∈ IF→Gb1...F→Gbi .D. Therefore, from (7.3) it follows that:
∀i < n pr(F→Gbi+1 |F→Gb1:bi.FGa.D) ≥ pr(F→Gbi+1|F→Gb1:bi .D)
=⇒
n−1∏
i=0
pr(F→Gbi+1 |F→Gb1:bi.FGa.D) ≥
n−1∏
i=0
pr(F→Gbi+1 |F→Gb1:bi.D) (7.4)
Due to the chain rule, the r.h.s. of the above equation is equal to pr(F→Gb1:bn |D):
n−1∏
i=0
pr(F→Gbi+1|F→Gb1:bi.D) =
pr(F→Gb1|D)·pr(F→Gb2|F→Gb1.D) . . . pr(F→Gbn|F→Gb1. . . F→Gbn−1.D) = pr(F→Gb1:bn |D)
Similarly, the l.h.s. of (7.4) is equal to pr(F→Gb1:bn |FGa.D). Therefore:
pr(F→Gb1:bn|FGa.D) ≥ pr(F→Gb1:bn|D)
This entails Ξ1 ≥ 1 and since Ξ2 > 1, according to Lemma 1, NC holds.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Similar to the method used in the proof of Theorem 3.1
and by using inequality (3.2) instead of inequality (3.1) it can be proved that:
∀i < n pr(F→Gbi+1|F→Gb1:bi. FGa. D) < pr(F→Gbi+1|F→Gb1:bi. D)
Consequently:
Ξ1 =
∏n−1
i=1 pr(F→Gbi+1 |F→Gb1:bi.FGa.D)∏n−1
i=1 pr(F→Gbi+1 |F→Gb1:bi.D)
·
pr(F→Gb1 |FGa.D)
pr(F→Gb1 |D)
<
pr(F→Gb1 |FGa.D)
pr(F→Gb1 |D)
(7.5)
25Note that Ξ1 indicates the effect of the observation Fa.Ga, on the probability that unobserved
individuals satisfy F→G and Ξ2 corresponds to the effect of elimination of the possibility that the
observed object is a counterexample to the generalization.
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For conciseness, let p := pr(F→Gb1 |FGa.D) and q := pr(F→Gb1 |D).
pr(¬F→Ga|F→Gb1: bn .D) < (1− p)− (1− q), since F→G = ¬FG¯ and by inequality (3.3)
=⇒ pr(F→Ga|F→Gb1: bn .D) > 1− q + p (7.6)
Finally,
1− p > 1− q =⇒ p < q, since D ∈ ∆ and by (3.2)
=⇒ p · (1− q) < q · (1− q) =⇒ p < q · (1− q + p), since q < 1
=⇒
p
q
< 1− q + p since q > 0
=⇒ Ξ1 < pr(F→Ga|F→Gb1:bn .D), by (7.5) and (7.6)
=⇒ Ξ1 · Ξ2 < 1 =⇒ NC does not hold. by Lemma 1
7.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Lemma 2. Under PJ, for any set of objects {1, 2, . . ., n} ⊆ U , a ∈ U and any
D ∈ ∆ that does not determine the value of ψa:
(Group PJ) pr(ψ1:n|ψa.D) ≥ pr(ψ1:n|D) (7.7)
(Negative Group PJ) pr(ψ1:n| ¬ψa.D) ≤ pr(ψ1:n|D) (7.8)
Proof. The proof is based on mathematical induction.
1. Proof of relation (7.7):
(I) For n = 1, relation (7.7) is equivalent to relation (2.1) and therefore valid.
(II) Assume for n = k relation (7.7) holds. We prove that for n = k + 1, it holds
as well:
pr(ψ1:k+1|ψa.D) = pr(ψ1:k.ψk+1|ψa.D)
= pr(ψk+1|ψa.D) · pr(ψ1:k|ψa.ψk+1.D)
≥ pr(ψk+1|D) · pr(ψ1:k|ψa.ψk+1.D), by inequality (2.1)
≥ pr(ψk+1|D) · pr(ψ1:k|ψk+1.D), (2.1) applied to (ψk+1.D) ∈ ∆
= pr(ψ1:k+1|D)
By (I) & (II), mathematical induction implies (7.7) for all n.
2. Proof of relation (7.8):
Under PJ: ∀b pr(¬ψb| ¬ψa.D) ≥ pr(¬ψb|D), therefore:
1− pr(ψb| ¬ψa.D) ≥ 1− pr(ψb|D) =⇒ pr(ψb| ¬ψa.D) ≤ pr(ψb|D) (7.9)
Similar to the previous case and by using (7.9) instead of (2.1), inequality (7.8) can
be proved easily.
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Lemma 3. For all 1 ≤ k ≤ N , D := F1:k.(¬F )k+1:N and E being an arbitrary
proposition: pr(H|E .D) = pr(G1:k|E .D).
Proof. l.h.s. = pr
(
F→G1:k.F→Gk+1:N |E . F1:k.(¬F )k+1:N
)
= pr
(
F→G1:k.F1:k.F→Gk+1:N .(¬F )k+1:N |E . F1:k.(¬F )k+1:N
)
= pr
(
(F→G.F )1:k.(F→G.¬F )k+1:N |E . F1:k.(¬F )k+1:N
)
= pr
(
(F.G)1:k.(¬F )k+1:N |E . F1:k.(¬F )k+1:N
)
(since F→Gb.Fb ≡ Fb.Gb and F→Gb.¬Fb
≡ ¬Fb)
= pr
(
F1:k.G1:k.(¬F )k+1:N |E . F1:k.(¬F )k+1:N
)
= pr
(
G1:k|E . F1:k.(¬F )k+1:N
)
= r.h.s.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. In the following relations, D := F1:k.(¬F )k+1:N .
(I) Proof of relation (4.1), i.e. pr(H |Gk . D) > pr(H|D) by PJ:
pr(H|Gk . D) = pr(G1:k|Gk . D), by Lemma 3
= pr(G1:k−1|Gk . D) ≥ pr(G1:k−1|D), by Lemma 2
> pr(G1:k|D), adding Gk & Cournot’s pp. (note: D 0 Gk)
= pr(H|D), by Lemma 3.
(II) Proof of relation (4.2), i.e. pr(H |GN . D) ≥ pr(H|D) by PJ:
pr(H|GN . D) = pr(G1:k|GN . D), by Lemma 3
≥ pr(G1:k|D), by relation (7.7) (Group PJ)
= pr(H|D), by Lemma 3.
(III) Proof of relation (4.3) i.e. pr(H | ¬GN . D) ≤ pr(H|D) by PJ:
pr(H|¬GN . D) = pr(G1:k|¬GN . D), by Lemma 3
≤ pr(G1:k|D), by relation (7.8) (Neg.GroupPJ)
= pr(H|D), by Lemma 3.
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(IV) Proof of relation (4.4) , i.e. pr(H |Gk . D) > pr(H|D) by RA:
pr(H|Gk . D) = pr(G1:k−1|Gk . D), by Lemma 3
=
k−1∏
i=1
pr(Gi|G1:i−1.Gk.D), by the chain rule
=
k−1∏
i=1
pr(Gi|Fi.Fk.Gk.G1:i−1.D), since D ⊢ Fi.Fk
>
k−1∏
i=1
pr(Gi|Fi.G1:i−1.D), by RA (and since G1:i−1.D ∈ ∆)
=
k−1∏
i=1
pr(Gi|G1:i−1.D), since for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : D ⊢ Fi
= pr(G1:k−1|D), by the chain rule
> pr(G1:k|D), by adding Gk & Cournot’s pp. (note: D 0 Gk)
= pr(H|D), by Lemma 3.
7.3 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Definition. Having a set C ⊆ U and pi being a permutation (of U), Cpi is defined
as: Cpi := {pi(b) : b ∈ C}. It is obvious that Upi = U .
The following two relations directly follows from the assumption that pi is a bijection:
∀C ⊆ U |C| = |Cpi| (7.10)
∀C,C ′ ⊆ U C 6= C ′ =⇒ Cpi 6= C ′pi (7.11)
Lemma 4. H = Hpi where pi is an arbitrary permutation (of U).
Proof. Hpi =
∧
b∈U
F→Gpi(b) =
∧
pi(b)∈Upi
F→Gpi(b) =
∧
b′∈Upi
F→Gb′ =
∧
b′∈U
F→Gb′ = H
The first equality holds by definition. The second equality holds because:
b ∈ U ⇐⇒ pi(b) ∈ Upi. In the r.h.s. of the third equality, pi(b) is renamed to b′.
The fourth equality holds because U = Upi (note that pi is a permutation in U).
The last equality is the definition of H .
Lemma 5. For all 1 ≤ k ≤ N , all permutations pi and CU,k being defined as the set
of all subsets of U which have size k:
C
pi
U,k := {C
pi : C ∈ CU,k} = CU,k (7.12)
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Proof. Equality (7.10) implies, ∀Cpi ∈ CpiU,k |C
pi| = |C| = k, which means: Cpi is
a k-combination from U ; So from the definition of CU,k it follows that C
pi ∈ CU,k.
Therefore, CpiU,k ⊆ CU,k. Conversely, according to relation (7.11) and the definition
of CpiU,k in (7.12), there is a one-to-one relation between the members of CU,k and
C
pi
U,k. This entails: |C
pi
U,k| = |CU,k|. Thus: C
pi
U,k = CU,k.
Lemma 6. For all permutations pi (of the set U), and for all integers k ∈ [1, N ]:
Exact(k, U, F ) = Exactpi(k, U, F )
Proof. By definition, Exactpi(k, U, F ) :=
∨
C∈CU,k
(
∧
a∈C
Fpi(a) .
∧
b6∈C
¬Fpi(b))
=
∨
C∈CU,k
(
∧
pi(a)∈Cpi
Fpi(a) .
∧
pi(b)6∈Cpi
¬Fpi(b)), since c ∈ C ⇐⇒ pi(c) ∈ C
pi
=
∨
Cpi∈Cpi
U,k
(
∧
pi(a)∈Cpi
Fpi(a) .
∧
pi(b)6∈Cpi
¬Fpi(b)), since C ∈ CU,k ⇐⇒ C
pi ∈ CpiU,k
=
∨
C′∈Cpi
U,k
(
∧
a′∈C′
Fa′ .
∧
b′ 6∈C′
¬Fb′), renaming C
pi to C ′ and pi(c) to c′
=
∨
C′∈CU,k
(
∧
a′∈C′
Fa′ .
∧
b′ 6∈C′
¬Fb′), since C
pi
U,k = CU,k, (Lemma 5)
= Exact(k, U, F ), by definition.
Definition. For each C ⊆ U , the proposition Z(C,F ) is defined as:
Z(C,F ) :=
∧
a∈C
Fa .
∧
b6∈C
¬Fb (7.13)
which allows to write definition (4.5) as: Exact(k, U, F ) :=
∨
C∈CU,k
Z(C,F )
Lemma 7. For arbitrary propositions A and B and 1 ≤ k ≤ N :
pr(Exact(k, U, F ).A|B) =
∑
C∈CU,k
pr(Z(C,F ).A|B) (7.14)
Proof. ∀C ′ 6= C ′′ ∈ CU,k:
∃b ∈ U b ∈ C ′ and b 6∈ C ′′, C ′&C ′′ being distinct with same size
=⇒ Z(C′,F ) |= Fb and Z(C′′,F ) |= ¬Fb, by definition (7.13)
=⇒ Z(C′,F ).Z(C′′,F ) |= Fb .¬Fb ≡ ⊥
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Therefore, the sequence {Z(C,F )}C∈CU,k consists of mutually disjoint events. Hence,
by the third Kolmogorov probability axiom, for all propositions A and B:
pr(Exact(k, U, F ).A|B) = pr
( ∨
C∈CU,k
(Z(C,F ).A)|B
)
=
∑
C∈CU,k
pr(Z(C,F ).A|B) (7.15)
Lemma 8. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ N . For all C ∈ CU,k and for all permutations pi:
Zpi(C,F ) = Z(Cpi ,F )
Proof.
Zpi(C,F ) =
∧
a∈C
Fpi(a) .
∧
b6∈C
¬Fpi(b) by relation (7.13)
=
∧
pi(a)∈Cpi
Fpi(a) .
∧
pi(b)6∈Cpi
¬Fpi(b) by def. c ∈ C ⇐⇒ pi(c) ∈ C
pi
=
∧
a′∈Cpi
Fa′ .
∧
b′ 6∈Cpi
¬Fb′ renaming pi(a) to a
′ and pi(b) to b′
= Z(Cpi ,F ) by relation (7.13).
Proof of Theorem 4.2. For the sake of conciseness, here we only prove relation
(4.7) i.e.:
∀a ∈ U, 1 ≤ k ≤ N pr
(
H|Exact(k, U, F ) .Fa.Ga
)
= pr
(
H|F1:k.¬Fk+1:N .Gk
)
The remaining relations (4.6, 4.8 & 4.9) can be proved using the same method and
by small (and obvious) appropriate modifications.
For the sake of simplicity, we first swap the names of the objects a and 1 as
follows: Let pi′ := {a/1; 1/a}. By the exchangeability assumption:
pr
(
H|Exact(k, U, F ) .Fa.Ga
)
= pr
(
Hpi
′
|Exactpi
′
(k, U, F ) .Fpi′(a).Gpi′(a)
)
= pr
(
H|Exact(k, U, F ) .F1.G1
)
, by Lemmas 4 and 6
=
pr(H) · pr
(
Exact(k, U, F ). F1.G1|H
)
pr
(
Exact(k, U, F ) .F1.G1
) , by Bayes rule. (7.16)
Now:
pr
(
Exact(k, U, F ) .F1.G1|H
)
=
∑
C∈CU,k
pr(Z(C,F ).F1.G1|H), by Lemma 7
=
∑
C∈CU,k s.t. 1∈C
pr(Z(C,F ).F1.G1|H) +
∑
C∈CU,k s.t. 16∈C
pr(Z(C,F ).F1.G1|H)
=
∑
C∈CU,k s.t. 1∈C
pr(Z(C,F ).F1.G1|H) (7.17)
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The second summation is eliminated because in the case of any C ∈ CU,k
such that 1 6∈ C, Z(C,F )  ¬F1 (see definition (7.13)), therefore in this case,
pr(Z(C,F ).F1.G1|H) = pr(Z(C,F ).¬F1.F1.G1|H) = pr(⊥|H) = 0.
Due to the exchangeability assumption, the members of the first summation are
all equal. The reasoning is as follows:
In the case of any C ∈ CU,k such that 1 ∈ C, there exists some permutation that
map each of the members of C to the set {1, 2, . . . k} with 1 as a fixed point i.e.:
∀C ∈ CU,k s.t. 1 ∈ C : ∃pi C
pi = {1, 2, . . . , k}, pi(1) = 1 (7.18)
In fact, for any member of CU,k, exactly (k − 1)! permutations with such properties
exist. Using such permutations, ∀C ∈ CU,k s.t. 1 ∈ C:
∃pi pr(Z(C,F ).F1.G1|H) = pr(Z
pi
(C,F ).Fpi(1).Gpi(1)|H
pi), by exchangeability
= pr(Z({1,...,k},F ).Fpi(1).Gpi(1)|H
pi), using (7.18) in Lemma 8
= pr(Z({1,...,k},F ).F1.G1|H
pi), 1 being a fix point
= pr(Z({1,...,k},F ).F1.G1|H), by Lemma 4
= pr(F1:k.¬Fk+1:N .G1|H), expanding Z(.,.) by def. (7.13)
(7.19)
Thus, combining (7.17) and (7.19):
pr
(
Exact(k, U, F ).F1.G1|H
)
=
∑
C∈CU,k s.t. 1∈C
pr(Z(C,F ).F1.G1|H)
=
(
N − 1
k − 1
)
pr(F1:k.¬Fk+1:N .G1|H) (7.20)
By a similar justification:
pr
(
Exact(k, U, F ).F1.G1
)
=
(
N − 1
k − 1
)
pr(F1:k.¬Fk+1:N .G1) (7.21)
Combining equations (7.20), (7.21) and (7.16):
pr
(
Exact(k, U, F ) .F1.G1|H
)
=
pr(H) · pr
(
Exact(k, U, F ) .F1.G1|H
)
pr
(
Exact(k, U, F ) .F1.G1
)
=
(
N−1
k−1
)
pr(H) pr(F1:k¬Fk+1:N .G1|H)(
N−1
k−1
)
pr(F1:k¬Fk+1:N .G1)
= pr(H|F1:k¬Fk+1:N .G1)
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A List of Notation
Symbol Explanation
U = {1, 2, . . . , υ} universe of arbitrary size N
1, 2, . . . , N objects of universe U (short form)
υ, υ′, υ′′ ∈ N symbols used to denote the size of universe
Uυ = {1, 2, . . . , υ} universe of size υ
α ≤ β lower and higher bounds for the size of the universe
a, b, c and b1, b2, . . . typical objects (or individuals) (not necessarily consecutive)
ψ typical 1-place predicate
ψb a proposition assigning predicate ψ to object b
ψbi:bj ψbi .ψbi+1 . . . ψbj
F,G atomic 1-place predicates
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Fb, Gb propositions assigning F and G to object b, respectively
F¯G¯b, F¯Gb, FG¯b, FGb complete descriptions (of object b)
F→Gb Fb → Gb ≡ ¬Fb ∨Gb ≡ ¬FG¯b
H General hypothesis: ∀b ∈ U F→Gb
E evidence: Fa.Ga
B,D typical (objective) background knowledge
ρ a typical proposition
Iρ set of all individuals described by ρ
Aρ set of all (simple) predicates involved in ρ
⊤ tautologous proposition
∆ set of all propositions in form of relation (1.3) (on universe U)
∆υ set of all propositions in form of relation (1.3) (on universe Uυ)
δ set of all complete descriptions that do not falsify H
CDV complete description vector
Ω set of all CDVs (w.r.t universe U)
Ωυ set of all CDVs (w.r.t. universe Uυ)
Ωα:β union of Ωα to Ωβ
ωΩυρ ⊆ Ωυ an event that corresponds proposition ρ (w.r.t. sample space Ωυ)
ωρ ⊆ Ωα:β an event that corresponds proposition ρ (w.r.t. sample space Ωα:β)
pr probability (over sample space Ω)
prυ probability (over sample space Ωυ)
Pr probability (over sample space Ωα:β)
pi, pi′, pi′′ typical permutations (i.e. bijections) in U
pi(b) an object that b ∈ U is mapped to by bijection pi
ρpi a proposition obtained from ρ by replacing any b ∈ Iρ with pi(b)
C,C ′, C ′′ ⊆ U typical subsets of U
Cpi {pi(b) : b ∈ C}
CU,k set of all subsets of U with cardinality k
C
pi
U,k {C
pi : C ∈ CU,k}
Z(C,F )
∧
a∈CFa .
∧
b6∈C¬Fb
Exact(k, U, F ) a proposition representing: “exactly k members of U are F”
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